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A policy statement by 
The National Council on Employment Policy*
Growing Concern
The United States' labor force and productivity data 
system faces a serious problem of deterioration at a time 
when the American economy is experiencing radical 
transformations. Changing public policies, combined with 
slumping productivity and other technological and social 
forces, are buffeting our society. Compounding the domestic 
factors is a growing internationalization in the flows of 
capital, commodities and labor, making the United States in 
creasingly cognizant of foreign economic conditions.
Given these changes and more recent shifts in social pro 
grams, federal spending, taxes, monetary policy and interna 
tional markets, measures are necessary to assess the impact 
of these transformations. Who in our society has been
*The National Council on Employment Policy is a private nonprofit organization of 
academicians and policy experts with a special interest in the areas of labor market and 
employment and training programs. This policy statement represents the combined judg 
ment of the Council members. Despite divergence of opinion on details, the members 
unanimously agreed to this statement.
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helped by the new economic policies, and who is experienc 
ing more economic hardship? What tools are available to 
track the resulting changes? What sectors have experienced 
gains in productivity, and what factors have caused these in 
creases? Our public policies and private investment decisions 
depend upon these data as billions of dollars literally are 
riding on the monthly labor force estimates published by the 
U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). An annual rise of 1 percent in unemployment can 
unleash various forces that can increase the federal deficit by 
some $25 billion, affecting not only millions of lives but also 
domestic and foreign financial markets which in turn feed 
back on labor market results. Also, estimates of local 
unemployment, income and related data determine the size 
of allocations for many federal programs.
The thermometer of labor force and productivity 
measurements has taken on an added importance. While 
politicians cannot rely solely upon statistics, it would be 
foolhardy to try to fashion economic policies without con 
sidering their impact on the workforce and households as 
summarized in our labor force data system. It is no wonder 
that President Reagan has displayed an interest not only in 
overall labor force data but even in the seasonal adjustment 
of labor force estimates one of the most arcane aspects of 
these data.
At a time when we need reliable labor force and produc 
tivity data, clear danger signals have emerged. First, some 
basic concepts have not been updated since the 1930s despite 
vast social and economic changes. Second, while our data 
system may not be exempt from budget reductions, there are 
some cost cutting moves that may save money in the short 
run only to wind up costing the nation more in the long run. 
Our labor force and productivity estimates should be able to 
play a major role in public policy formulation and in helping
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to evaluate the results of these efforts by providing feedback 
to alert policymakers concerned with possible mid-course 
corrections.
In general, there is much to be proud of in our workforce 
data system. However, there are indications that inertia may 
be setting in despite the best efforts of many competent and 
dedicated government experts. Yet, the data system can be 
expanded and kept up to date with minimal costs to help 
shed light on the formulation and evaluation of economic 
policies. Our data system will deteriorate if we cannot 
redesign and modernize it. Depreciation is a factor in this 
social investment, just as in our system of public works and 
private capital.
All this indicates serious potential problems. It should be 
remembered that no law forces households or employers to 
participate in the government surveys which generate these 
data. Without full public support and trust, the system 
would fall apart very rapidly. However, policymakers, the 
media and many citizens have increasingly questioned this 
data system. It would be wise to consider these rumblings, 
for they indicate serious potential problems.
The good news is that the American labor force data 
system and productivity estimates remain free from partisan 
political influences. On a methodological level the system re 
mains one of the world's best and in many ways number 
one in terms of statistical sampling techniques and the 
utilization of computer technology and analysis. This data 
system still represents a standard of excellence that most 
other nations strive to emulate.
The bad news is that the system has been far slower in 
adopting basic concepts and definitions to reflect current 
economic conditions and workforce behavior. This lag has 
reduced the system's usefulness in the policy process.
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Economic Hardship
Our current labor force data system often falls short of 
providing the necessary information for policy formulation. 
It is not just a question of whether or not the unemployment 
rate should be jiggled up or down. The real problem centers 
in on the basic concepts of what we should measure.
One of the major areas in which the American data system 
has experienced the most inertia concerns the concept of 
economic hardship. Basing public policy on indices measur 
ing the number of people employed and those not employed 
but looking for jobs might have been adequate in the 1930s, 
but it does not provide the data needed in the 1980s. Given 
the massive size of the government's income support system, 
the conditions of the working poor, and vast changes in the 
composition of the labor force, we should move beyond the 
assumption, contained in our current statistics, that people 
are either employed or forced into idleness.
In the pre-New Deal days when few needy individuals 
received income support and people either worked or starv 
ed, these concepts reflected reality. But, for better or worse, 
we do not live in such a society. What is required for mean 
ingful analysis and public policy direction are new social in 
dicators that would not only measure employment, but 
would link earnings and income data with labor force status, 
time worked and household living conditions. Such indices 
would tell us the number of persons who are unable to attain 
a socially acceptable standard of living through work.
When the government started its monthly effort to 
measure unemployment toward the end of the Great Depres 
sion, economic hardship was more directly correlated with 
unemployment. Under the conditions of the 1930s, any 
job no matter what the rate of pay or hours of work was 
considered better than no job. Hence, the length of the ranks
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of the unemployed was an acceptable proxy measure for 
deprivation.
The American economy has undergone major institutional 
change since the 1930s, and yet the concepts and definitions 
used in forming the unemployment statistics have hardly 
changed at all. The American economy now includes a vast 
transfer payment system carrying an annual price tag in ex 
cess of $380 billion or one out of every six dollars of 
disposable personal income. Public transfer payments have 
an impact on all segments of society, and in fact the vast ma 
jority goes to the middle class and affluent. Our concepts 
about labor force behavior reflect conditions of the Great 
Depression and are not necessarily applicable to today's 
labor markets. For example, an individual may be 
unemployed and yet receive income support, or be part of a 
household with income that may indicate affluence.
However, there is another side to the coin. For millions of 
Americans, employment even a full-time job does not of 
fer escape from poverty. An individual may be employed 
and still live in poverty as defined by the federal government. 
A statistical system that reports labor force participation 
monthly but pays only scant attention to income and 
underemployment is bound to fail as an indicator of real 
conditions. We are bound to draw disastrously wrong con 
clusions when we use such a statistic as a foundation for 
governmental policies.
It is ironic that meteorologists have recognized a similar 
problem in their field, and they have devised solutions which 
the public uses every day. For example, what makes us un 
comfortable during a winter day? The meteorologists' con 
cept of the "wind-chill" factor combines temperature with 
wind data to produce a realistic and understandable measure 
of actual outdoor conditions. The older measure, 
temperature, simply does not convey enough information
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about windy, chilly days. On summer days, the 
termperature-humidity index combines the factors that make 
us uncomfortable. By itself temperature might not make us 
uncomfortable, and it must be placed in context with other 
factors.
A similar concept should be applied to employment, earn 
ings, and household data to provide a realistic measure of 
labor market-related economic hardship. The impact of 
government policies and the extent to which economic 
hardship has been increased or reduced cannot be deter 
mined until we forge new statistical concepts for labor force 
measurements. Consider two individuals: person "A" works 
full-time, full-year at minimum wage and is the only wage 
earner in the family. Person "B" has just been laid off, but 
is part of a two-person household with the other member 
earning $25,000 a year. Common sense would indicate that 
"A" should be considered in the economic hardship ranks 
while "B" would not be facing deprivation. And yet under 
our current concepts "B" is counted as unemployed and 
therefore presumably in hardship while "A" would not be 
included in our leading measure of labor market pathologies. 
The unemployment statistics provide a shaky foundation for 
deciding national policy, and they are even of less value in 
deciding the allocation of federal funds among states and 
local areas.
Congress has recognized these problems on several occa 
sions and has mandated BLS to come up with labor market- 
related hardship measures. 1 However, BLS has been very 
slow to comply, and its recent first report on the subject fell 
short in meeting the concerns expressed in the congressional 
mandate. 2 A reporting system that would link labor market
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status with earnings and income should attempt to measure 
at a minimum:
 Inadequate individual earnings: How many persons 
who participate in the workforce during the year are 
unable to earn at least the minimum wage equivalent for 
their total hours of work availability?
While individual data are important, it is necessary to 
place a person's earnings in the context of their 
household status and family economic need. For these 
reasons, a reporting system should also measure:
 Inadequate family earnings: How many workforce 
participants are in families whose total wages and 
salaries are below the poverty level?
 Inadequate family income: How many workforce 
participants have family incomes (i.e., earnings plus any 
transfer payments and certain in-kind aid) below the 
poverty level?
The answers to the above questions can be derived annual 
ly from existing labor force data at a minimal cost. The 
resulting reporting system can provide important insights in 
to labor force operations, 3 including:
 One of every four workforce participants failed to earn 
the equivalent of the minimum wage for the hours the person 
was available for work during 1979. This count of inade 
quate individual earnings was nearly 5 times the average 
monthly unemployment level and 1.5 times the number who 
experienced any unemployment during the entire year.
 One of every nine workers lived in families with below- 
poverty earnings. The number of workers with inadequate 
family earnings was more than double the average annual 
unemployed and almost three-quarters the number who ex 
perienced any unemployment during the entire year.
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 6 percent of the workforce remained in poor families 
after receiving income transfers and other earnings sup 
plements.
 Only half of those who experienced joblessness during 
1979 had annual earnings below the minimum wage 
equivalent for the hours they were available for work. Less 
than one in four resided in families with below-poverty earn 
ings. Only one in seven remained in poverty after receipt of 
transfer and other earnings supplements.
 Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment, 
rather than joblessness, were the major causes of economic 
hardship. Four of every ten poor persons above age 15 work 
ed in 1980 including 2.7 million low-paid workers employed 
full-time year round who lived in families with below- 
poverty earnings.
These data illuminate many concerns expressed by labor 
market analysts regarding the meaning of labor market 
status and economic hardship in our society. These same 
measures also show that:
 The incidence of inadequate earnings and income is 
most prevalent among female workers, minorities, younger 
and older labor force participants, and those with limited 
education, workers in service jobs, and residents of 
nonmetropolitan areas and large central cities. As a general 
rule, the burdens of hardship are more maldistributed than 
the burdens of unemployment (Figure 1).
 Economic hardship is a continuing structural problem, 
rising and falling over the business cycle, but changing pro 
portionately less than unemployment. Between 1979 and 
1980, when average annual unemployment rose by a fourth, 
the number of individuals with earnings below the minimum 
wage equivalent rose by only a sixth and the number of 
workers in families with below-poverty earnings by a 
seventh.
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Figure 1. The Rate of Economic Hardship is Higher Than the Rate 
of Unemployment for Female and Minority 
Labor Force Participants (1980)
Average annual 
unemployment
SOURCE: Robert Taggart, Hardship: The Welfare Consequences of Labor Market Prob 
lems (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1982).
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 During the most recent complete business cycle, be 
tween 1974-1980, the poverty incidence among workforce 
participants increased because of the declining effectiveness 
of the cash transfer safety net.
 These data indicate that to significantly alleviate labor 
market-related hardship would require a combination of 
macroeconomic and targeted structural measures, combined 
with expanded income transfers for the working poor. 
Economic recovery alone will not solve the economic hard 
ship problem of labor force participants. Assuming a 9 per 
cent unemployment rate in 1982 and a 5 percent inflation 
rate, an estimated 17 million workforce participants are in 
families with earnings below the poverty level. But if the 
unemployment rate fell to 7 percent and the inflation rate to 
2.5 percent, the number of workers living in poverty 
households would drop by less than 2 million, and their 
families would still need nearly $45 billion in earnings or sup 
plements to escape poverty.
This briefly summarized system of measuring the labor 
market-related hardship is an indication of what can be done 
with available CPS data and minimal expenditures. For all 
of these reasons, we strongly recommend that our official 
labor force measurement system should include indices link 
ing employment with earnings and income along the lines 
suggested above. Policymakers need relevant data to form 
and evaluate public programs. The lack of such hardship 
estimates is a major weakness in the current system.
Productivity and Social Indicators
Another major area of concern focuses on American pro 
ductivity data. Given the recent problems with slow growth, 
inflation and unemployment, policymakers have become 
highly interested in productivity growth rates, and they have
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issued numerous proposals to boost the slumping American 
trends.
The traditional concept of productivity considers only 
output-per-workhour. In 1981 output-per-workhour, known 
as labor productivity, of the private business economy rose 
at only one percent compared with a threefold increase in 
labor productivity between 1948 and 1973. By the end of the 
1970s, not only were labor productivity growth rates slump 
ing, but at times they were even negative.
It is commonly assumed that the health of the economy 
cannot be restored, and real wage gains cannot be resumed, 
until productivity growth rates rise commensurately (Figure 
2). At the same time concern is expressed that the United 
States has lost some of its former competitive advantage over 
foreign nations due to the fact that their productivity growth 
rates have tended to be higher than America's. There also 
has been a major shift of the American workforce into the 
service sector of the economy, and it is much more difficult 
to measure productivity in this area than in manufacturing 
or agriculture. Even when measured, there is also serious 
concern that it may be much more difficult to raise the 
output-per-workhour in the service sector.
With so much interest expressed in productivity growth 
rates, the data used to measure productivity must face as 
close an examination as the concepts of linking employment 
with earnings and family income. Also in this field there 
have been major advances in the basic concepts of how pro 
ductivity should be measured. The more recent concepts 
center on total factor productivity rather than on only labor 
productivity. Yet these advances still have not been reflected 
in our official data system.
Output-per-workhour, based on establishment survey 
reports submitted voluntarily by some 165,000 employers,
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Figure 2. Average Annual Compensation Per Full Time 
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SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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does not fully take into consideration or show the influence 
of other factors such as capital. A different picture emerges 
by looking at total factor productivity which relates output 
to all associated inputs. 4 Suppose, for example, that the 
labor required to produce a bushel of wheat vastly declines. 
Instead of human labor power, the farming process might 
become highly energy-intensive (i.e., energy, such as oil, 
petroleum-based fertilizer, and machinery, is substituted for 
human labor power). Total factor productivity would not 
rise as much as output-per-workhour in this case. Given the 
recent hikes in energy prices, the substitution of energy for 
labor cannot be ignored.
Conventional productivity measures, which concentrate 
on labor, may be overstating productivity growth rates. In 
1981, total factor productivity rose only 0.4 percent, or 60 
percent less than the BLS output-per-workhour figure. 
Moreover, the establishment survey is designed so that it ob 
tains better productivity data within the goods producing 
sector of the economy rather than in the more rapidly grow 
ing service sector. In fact, productivity is much more dif 
ficult to estimate within the service sector because of the dif 
ficulty in measuring units of production.
There are many conceptual and data problems in forming 
total factor productivity estimates. For example, how is 
capital to be aggregated and measured? How should capital 
stock be depreciated so that net capital levels are used in 
forming these estimates? The BLS has undertaken research 
into these questions, and it does hope by 1983 to make 
estimates that move beyond only labor productivity.
Similar to the area of unemployment, productivity 
analysis all too often has been hampered by a "one number 
syndrome." Labor productivity, like the official unemploy 
ment rate, is presumed to illuminate developments it was 
never designed to handle. Labor productivity estimates
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measure the change in labor spent per unit of output over 
time, and this may be all that is required for some analysis. 
However, for certain investment and growth policy decisions 
capital, labor and energy substitutions cannot be ignored, 
and it is significant to look at a combined measure of all in 
put requirements per unit of output over time.
We support BLS efforts to publish productivity estimates 
that not only include output-per-workhour but indices that 
also report total factor productivity, capital productivity, 
and energy productivity.
We also recommend that efforts be expanded to revise the 
establishment survey so that it mil better capture productivi 
ty and other changes within the rapidly growing service sec 
tor.
There are many reasons which can explain the recent 
decline in American productivity growth rates, but one key 
factor centers in on the concept of externalities which often 
are only measured by our social indicators. For example, 
prior to environmental laws a firm may have produced a ton 
of metal per hour plus an unhealthy level of pollution. 
Capital investment to clean up the air may now result in the 
firm producing a ton of metal per hour plus a safer environ 
ment. However, conventional productivity estimates will not 
capture this change since they only look at private produc 
tivity levels and not at social productivity that includes exter 
nalities.
Social indicators are required to augment the formal 
economic data on the labor force. Public investment has 
played a significant role in developing these newer data 
sources. In general, this public investment in social in 
dicators has been sound, and should be continued.
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Longitudinal Data
The current population survey and the establishment 
survey the two main samples discussed so far are most 
often used to create cross-sectional data, which are like a 
snapshot taken at one point in time. Several pictures can be 
placed together for a time series, which shows changes over 
months and years. While this provides policymakers with 
more information, it has problems. The individuals in each 
time series observation are, most often, not the same people. 
For this type of information, longitudinal data which follow 
specific individuals over time can provide a wealth of 
knowledge. Longitudinal data can help in such policy related 
questions as:
 What happens to families when they go through a 
divorce? What happens to labor market activity and 
earnings? Are the children reduced to poverty?
 What are the benefits and costs of specific employ 
ment and training programs for different types of in 
dividuals? What seems to work best and for whom?
 What is the full impact of business cycle conditions 
on different types of households?
 What are the net impacts of workfare and welfare 
programs?
Some of the most important policy-related questions can 
best be answered by longitudinal data. Part of the reason 
most econometric models failed to predict the major influx 
of women into the workforce was because their estimates 
were based on cross-sectional data on such variables as a 
wife and husband's educational and earnings status. The 
cross-sectional picture proved to be misleading.
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The federal government has been the major sponsor of 
longitudinal data series. From the point of view of policy 
formulation and evaluation, longitudinal data collection and 
analysis are highly productive investments of research 
dollars. There has been some concern expressed by leading 
labor force analysts that, in an effort to cut domestic spend 
ing, these efforts will be vastly reduced. 5 It would be a 
serious mistake to trim investment in the collection and 
analysis of longitudinal data. The fixed costs of beginning or 
restarting the collection of data loom much larger than con 
tinuing longitudinal sets once started. Research on the labor 
force and work-related issues would consequently suffer if 
longitudinal data collection were halted or significantly 
reduced.
Also, different federal agencies are the sponsors of various 
longitudinal surveys. Given the diversity of sponsorship, it is 
important to have a means for fostering coordination so as 
to avoid both overlap and omission. While cross-sectional 
data can tell us "how many," longitudinal data centers on 
"who," "why," and "do policies make a difference?" 
Sound social investment in data should include significant 
allocations to these newer surveys.
We also believe that administrative data can be put to 
much better uses than they are currently given in many cases. 
The administrative data are already being collected as part of 
program operations, and they often can provide a rich 
longitudinal data source. In some cases administrative data 
remain an untapped gold mine. Government agencies should 
further explore linking administrative and survey records.
Misplaced Savings
While strict budget constraints have been applied to most 
areas of nondefense spending, there are indications that cer 
tain recent decisions in the area of labor force measures may
Labor Force & Productivity Measurements 19
be penny wise but pound foolish. For example, six years ago 
Congress mandated the establishment of a commission 
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the federal 
employment and unemployment statistics. Following the re 
quirements of the law, in October 1981 Secretary of Labor 
Raymond Donovan reported on the disposition of the Na 
tional Commission on Employment and Unemployment 
Statistics report. His conclusion was that because of 
budgetary constraints, he would not implement the commis 
sion recommendations that involved added outlays no mat 
ter how miniscule the costs and regardless of the potential 
returns. 6
Recognizing that this is a period in which policymakers are 
reducing public efforts, we believe that the "savings" involv 
ed here are not justified even in an era of fiscal constraint. 
Policy decisions should not be based solely on gut feeling or 
preconceived ideology. Given the vast interest, scope, and 
billions of dollars involved in productivity, training and 
other labor-related policies, it makes sense to invest in a data 
system that produces sound and relevant estimates.
A major tenet of the Reagan administration has been the 
desirability of generally reducing the powers of government 
and assigning tasks to the lowest possible levels of govern 
ment if government intervention is deemed necessary. 
Realizing, however, that the federal government cannot give 
up all its responsibility of aid to states and localities, the 
Reagan administration has favored the disbursement of 
federal funds to states through block grants. Yet it would 
seem to be unwise for the federal government to leave the 
money in state capitols without giving them some guidance 
and a helping hand in its disbursement. Economy would cer 
tainly not be served if each state developed its own data base. 
Accordingly, if the federal funds are to be distributed on the 
basis of helping the truly needy or the dependent population, 
then it will be necessary for states to possess the necessary
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statistics on which to base allocation decisions. Cognizant of 
the costs, the commission still recommended that the present 
60,000 household sample of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) be doubled. The current CPS cannot even come close 
to accomplishing the job of helping states and local govern 
ments make wise decisions based on facts.
But even to keep the CPS a true random sample and to 
provide state and local data not now available on such a 
disaggregated level in the CPS our data system requires 
detailed Census numbers. The 1980 Census cost more than 
$1 billion in 1980, and yet the funds to process and tabulate 
the state and local data were not provided at the level needed 
to meet publicly announced time schedules.
These state and local data are crucial to many other data 
series. BLS uses Census data as a benchmark for its sample 
survey data. Without an accurate benchmark, the reliability 
of estimates produced by a sample survey cannot be verified. 
At the same time, these disaggregated estimates are needed 
to form policies that move beyond our general 
macroeconomic plans. Many of our difficulties should be 
addressed on the microeconomic level, but data from sources 
such as the CPS often are not good enough to accomplish 
this needed task. 7
There are numerous signs that our labor force data system 
appears to be in for some tough times. There is a major dif 
ference between rational budget restraints and a starvation 
diet. The irony is that the latter, in the long run, will wind up 
costing us more money than the former.
For example, an investment of funds in the redesign of the 
Current Population Survey will not only save millions of 
dollars in operating costs over the next decade, but it would 
also assure the maintenance of the quality of the critical 
statistics which come from this source. Without a redesign, 
the quality of the data on which so many national and state
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and local decisions are made can be expected to deteriorate 
over time.
In fiscal 1983 the federal government will be spending 
about 20 percent less than it did in 1980 for labor force and 
other economic data and this estimate does not even in 
clude the impact of inflation. We believe that BLS Commis 
sioner Janet Norwood got to the heart of the matter when 
she recently said:
There is a problem with a statistical system that 
stands still and doesn't do new things to keep up 
with the state of the art. You are really 
deteriorating, and in five years you can be a has- 
been; the whole statistical system in the United 
States could be that way. 8
We agree with Commissioner Norwood that the system 
faces two basic forms of deterioration. BLS already has been 
forced to reduce or eliminate the industry wage survey, the 
family budget survey, occupational outlook, strike statistics, 
and labor turnover data. Many users of these and other labor 
force data are just starting to miss these important data.
Even with massive budget reductions, BLS has been able 
to maintain the basic core programs including labor force 
status, prices, wages and productivity. However, sound 
policies require more than mere grinding out of data. The 
system will become obsolete if the analysts are not offered 
opportunities to innovate and experiment. This second form 
of deterioration could wind up being an even more serious 
problem than the first form.
While public regard for numerous national institutions has 
declined, our labor force statistics system has retained the 
faith of the vast majority of Americans. The reason this in 
formation system is so widely used by the government, 
private industry, unions, the media and researchers is
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because it is prepared by a dedicated and highly competent 
cadre of experts, and it retains a high level of public con 
fidence. It has taken years of hard work and nonpartisan 
dedication to build up this good will and public confidence. 
If this trust is lost due either to inertia or lack of 
funds then public confidence will not be easily regained.
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